Literature Review

Indirect tests; Mixed findings
Strand 1: Stock market reactions to voluntary bank loan announcements James (1987) ; Lummer & McConnell (1989) ; Billet et al. (1995; 2006) Strand 2: Relative informational efficiency of the secondary loan market Altman et al. (2004) ; Allen et al. (2004) ; Allen & Gottesman (2005) How is this study different?
Focus on the primary loan market and banks' ex ante information advantage (before loans are granted) Obtain bank loan contracts from mandatory SEC filings instead of voluntary announcements The new research design provides a more direct test
New Research Design
Directly investigate whether banks set the loan spreads as if they have anticipated the sign and magnitude of borrowers' future earnings news that is unexpected by the market (UE).
Loan spreads = f (banks' private information, public information) = f ( UE, credit rating, leverage, size, volatility, etc.)
The greater the relative information advantage, the stronger the sensitivity of loan spreads to UE.
Identify cross-sectional and inter-temporal contingencies where institutional details (asymmetric loss function, commitment, substitute goods, Regulation FD) imply differences in banks' economic incentives and examine whether the sensitivity of loan spreads to UE changes in predictable ways.
Time Line
Contract Initiation
End of Fiscal Quarter t
Q t Earnings Announcement
Loan Contract Filing Date
Analyst Forecasts
Exploit the timing differences in information availability to distinguish whether the results capture information or are driven by correlated omitted risk factors. Banks' asymmetric loss function (Ball, 2001) 3. The sensitivity of loan spreads to UE is weaker for secured loans.
Banks' incentive to investigate further is lower (Manove et al., 2001) 4. The sensitivity is weaker for firms with high analyst following.
More informative disclosure (Lang & Lundholm, 1996) ; Substitution effect 5. The sensitivity is stronger for firms with positive abnormal accruals.
Demand for and commitment to more scrutiny (Moerman, 2006; Sufi, 2007) 6. The sensitivity is stronger after Reg FD than before Reg FD.
Empirical Design
Dependent variable:
Loan Spread (AISD): "All-in-spread drawn" (Bharath, Sunder & Sunder. 2006) • Interest rate spread over LIBOR. LIBOR is a floating rate and fluctuates as the macro conditions change.
Independent variables:
Unexpected earnings (UE)
• Use analysts' consensus earnings forecast as a proxy for market expectation • O'Brien (1988): A superior surrogate; outperforms time-series models.
• Restrict all forecasts to be made after the facility active date • Consensus forecast is calculated using IBES Detail History file
• UE = (actual EPS − consensus forecast) ÷ |consensus forecast| Negative UE (NUE), High analyst following (D_AF), Income increasing abnormal accruals (Pos_AA), etc., and their interactions with UE
• Abnormal accruals is calculated using modified Jones model.
Control Variables
Loan characteristics:
Loan size (FSIZE), Loan maturity (MATURITY) Secured loan (SECURE), Loan purpose (TAKEOVER)
Firm-specific credit risk factors:
Credit rating (RATING, D_NR) Leverage, Total assets, Tobin's Q, Prior performance (LAGRET)
Forecast complexity and bias (COMPLEX) Normalized mean absolute value of analyst forecast errors over the 4 fiscal quarters prior to the loan quarter. Controls for systematic forecast bias if it is persistent in the short run. 
Economic Significance
For the final sample, the coefficient of UE is −6.64, the standard deviation of UE is 0.91 For the sub-sample with negative UE only, the coefficient of UE becomes −12 and the standard deviation of UE is 1.3
Ceteris paribus, one standard deviation of change in UE (negative UE) can be associated with an average change of 6 (15.6) basis points in loan spread.
After correcting for possible measurement errors in UE using an instrument variable estimation, the coefficient on predicted UE becomes −20.3 for the final sample.
One standard deviation of change in UE can be associated with an average change of 18.5 basis points in loan spread, about 20% of the median loan spread in the sample, and about a million dollar change in interest income for an average loan facility. 
Cross-sectional Analysis
Inter-temporal Analysis
A "difference-in-differences" test: compare banks' relative information advantage over analysts before and after Reg FD.
Filter out the macro-environment changes that have contaminated most studies in the literature (banks are exempted from Reg FD).
Cleaner evidence on the treatment effect: the change in analysts' information environment due to Reg FD. 
(Dependent variable: AISD)
Risk or Information?
If the research design captures superior information, then as the private information eventually gets revealed to the public, the results should vanish over time.
In contrast, if driven by a correlated omitted risk factor, the results are unlikely to disappear within a short period of time.
I find that the results become weaker when regressing loan spreads on UE one quarter forward, and disappear when regressing loan spreads on UE two quarters forward. To further mitigate this concern, I use abnormal returns around earnings announcement as an instrument for UE.
It is well documented that CAR (-1, +1) is correlated with UE, and in an efficient market it is reasonable to believe that abnormal return is not predictable, that is, CAR(-1, +1) is not correlated with the measurement error.
IV Estimation UE −20.327
Holding facility size constant, the higher the interest rate, the larger the interest expense, which may lead to lower UE, even if the existence of the loan is the only superior information that banks have.
If this interpretation is correct, the results should disappear for the subsample of decreasing interest expense and the sub-sample where the loan purpose is debt repay. 
More Sensitivity Analyses
The results are robust to alternative measures of UE, such as using abnormal return around earning announcement (beta= −99, t-stat= −1.77), using analysts' annual forecasts to obtain UE (beta = −6.896, t-stat = −3.87), or using price as a deflator.
The results are robust to using first deal only for each firm to mitigate the confounding issue of renewing loans and existing banking relationships.
(Beta = −5.742, t-stat = −2.36)
The results are robust to adding other controls for default risk, for example, Altman's Z-score, Ohlson's O-score, using CFO volatility instead of earnings volatility, ROA instead of lag return, etc.
The results are robust to controlling for other factors that may be correlated with analyst forecast errors, such as stock price, ∆ earnings.
The results are robust to various ways of winsorizing or truncating outliers. And the results remain for the Pre-Reg FD sub-sample.
